Ronald Bradshaw v. Walter W. Kershaw : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Ronald Bradshaw v. Walter W. Kershaw : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gustin and Gustin; Attorneys for Appellant, Walter W Kershaw; Pugsley, Hayes, Watkiss; Campbell
and Cowley; Attorneys for Respondent .
Robert C Cummings; William H Henderson; Mark S Miner; Attorneys for Appellants, Willard B
Rogers, Edward B Rogers, and Rockefeller Land and Livestock Company .
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Bradshaw v. Kershaw, No. 13502.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/745
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
BRiG'IAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
J. Reuben XIark Law School 
RONALD BRADSHAW, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
WALTER W. KERSHAW and H E L E N G. 
KERSHAW, his wife, WILLARD B. 
ROGERS, EDWARD B. ROGERS, and 
ROCKEFELLER LAND & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
13502 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Willard B. Rogers, Edward B. Rogers 
and Rockefeller Land & Livestock Co. 
Appeal from the Judgment of the District Court of 
Millard County, State of Utah 
The Honorable J. Harlan Burns, Judge 
GUSTIN & GUSTIN 
Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
Walter W. Kershaw 
PUGSLEY, HAYES, WATKISS, 
CAMPBELL & COWLEY 
El Paso Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
William H. Henderson 
Mark S. Miner 
320 South 3rd East, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants, 
Willard B. Rogers, Edward B. 
Rogers, and Rockefeller Land 
& Livestock Co. 
Umm 
JUN281974 
Clofk. Supramo Court, Utah Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF CASE 1 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN 
LOWER COURT 2 
R E L I E F SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
1. THE PROPERTY 3 
2. THE OPTION 4 
3. THE AGENCY 6 
4. ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE BY BRAD-
SHAW ON THE SCOPE, PURPOSE 
AND LIMITATIONS OF T H E 
OPTION 7 
ARGUMENT 9 
POINT I. THE OPTION WAS INVALID 
BECAUSE IT WAS SOLD BY CHRIS-
TENSEN TO BRADSHAW IN VIOLA-
TION OF CHRISTENSEN'S AGENCY 
ON USE OF T H E OPTION AND W I T H 
FULL KNOWLEDGE BY BRADSHAW 
OF THE OPTION'S LIMITATIONS 
AND THAT THE OPTION WAS SPENT 
AND INVALID 9 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
POINT II . BRADSHAW PURCHASED 
T H E PROPERTY SUBJECT TO KER-
SHAW'S CONVEYANCES TO ROGERS 
AS SAID CONVEYANCES TO ROGERS 
WERE RECORDED PRIOR TO T H E 
RECORDING OF T H E OPTION 13 
POINT I I I . THE COURT ERRED IN DIS-
CHARGING T H E JURY AFTER 
THREE AND ONE-HALF DAYS OF 
TRIAL 15 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN GRANTING SPECIFIC PERFORM-
ANCE IN THIS ACTION 16 
POINT V. SHOULD T H E COURT NOT 
QUIET TITLE IN ROCKEFELLER 
LAND AND LIVESTOCK COMPANY, 
THEN THE COURT SHOULD AWARD 
DAMAGES TO ROCKEFELLER 
AGAINST KERSHAW ON T H E 
WARRANTIES 19 
CONCLUSION 21 
CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED 
Am. Jur. 2d, Agency, Section 78 10 
3 Am. Jur. 2d, Agency, Section 199 10 
Holland v. Moreton (1960), 10 Utah 2d 390, 
353 Pac. 2d 989 12 
Holland v. Wilson (1958), 8 Utah 2d 11, 
327 Pac. 2d 250 15, 16 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Pitcher v. Lauritzen (1967), 18 Utah 2d 368, 
423 Pac. 2d 491 17 
Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks (1950), 
119 Utah 204, 225 Pac. 2d 739 16 
S T A T U T E S C I T E D 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Sec. 57-1-6 14 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Sec. 78-21-1 16 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 39 16 
iii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
R O N A L D B R A D S H A W , 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
W A L T E R W. K E R S H A W and H E L E N G. \ Case No. 
K E R S H A W , his wife, W I L L A R D B. ( 13502 
ROGERS, E D W A R D B. ROGERS, and 
R O C K E F E L L E R LAND & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Willard B. Rogers, Edward B. Rogers 
and Rockefeller Land & Livestock Co. 
N A T U R E OF CASE 
Action by respondent (plaintiff Bradshaw) for 
suit to quiet title and for specific performance by vir-
tue of an alleged option to purchase real property and 
well permit; counterclaim by appellant (defendant 
below) Rockefeller Land and Livestock Company for 
quiet title to said property and cross claim by Rocke-
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feller Land and Livestock Company against defendants, 
Walter W. Kershaw and Helen G. Kershaw for dam-
ages on warranties of title should their counterclaim 
for quiet title be denied. 
D I S P O S I T I O N OF CASE I N L O W E R COURT 
The lower court denied jury trial in quiet title 
action. I t then ruled that the option for purchase of the 
property (which option was assigned to plaintiff Brad-
shaw) was valid. I t denies the counterclaim of defen-
dant, Rockefeller Land and Livestock Company, for 
quiet title; denied said appellant's cross claim against 
Kershaw and ordered defendant, Kershaw, to convey 
property he did not own and to which he could not obtain 
title to plaintiff, Bradshaw. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment below 
which declared the option on the property valid, and 
seek a decision by the Supreme Court directing the lower 
court to enter judgment in favor of appellant, Rocke-
feller, on its counterclaim to quiet title on the 560 acres 
of land and the well permit, of a judgment against 
defendant Kershaw for $42,400.00 damages under the 
warranties of conveyances by Kershaw to appellant, 
Rockefeller Land and Livestock Company. If this be 
denied, then, as the counterclaim for quiet title is an 
action at law, reversal and trial by jury on the quiet 
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title action, trial by jury concerning the facts whether 
or not the option is a valid option and in the issue of 
damages against Kershaw. 
S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS 
1. THE PROPERTY. 
This brief is submitted by appellants, Rockefeller 
Land & Livestock Company, Willard Rogers and Ed-
ward Rogers. Willard B. Rogers is the principal owner 
of Rockefeller Land and Livestock Company and said 
appellant's interest is not at variance, and therefore for 
convenience these two appellants will sometimes be 
referred to as "Rogers". Edward B. Rogers has no in-
volvement in this suit and should be dismissed therefrom. 
This action involves three tracts of land and a well 
permit. Rogers seek to quiet title to (two) tracts of land 
and to clarify title to the well permit. The third tract of 
land (the Kimball ranch) is important to the considera-
tion of this action, but its title is not in dispute. 
(1) The main dispute concerns 480 acres contained 
in the Staples escrow. In regard thereto in 1966 Grant 
and Grace Staples sold this 480 acres tract together 
with other real and personal property to Marion Kesler 
and others for $39,560.00 by written agreement entitled 
E S C R O W A G R E E M E N T which was admitted in 
this action as Exhibit P-2. Kershaw purchased this 
escrow and sold this 480 acres by deed and warranties 
to Rogers subject to escrow with balance due thereon 
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of about $26,000.00. See Exhibits P-2, P-3, D-7 and 
D-9. Rogers paid Kershaw $5,000.00, assumed the 
debts and has paid to date $6,600 to the bank in Rich-
field on the option balance. 
(2) Second tract of land is an 80 acre tract con-
tiguous to the above 480 acres but not a part thereof, it 
being owned by Grant and Grace Staples and its title 
being involved in a separate probate proceedings and 
not available to Kershaw. (Tr. 152, 298). 
(3) The well permit concerns a six second-foot well 
permit previously owned by Milo and Boyd Watts who 
sold to Kershaw, who conveyed to Rogers. This well 
permit is not a part of the above escrow and was author-
ized, expended and used on the Kimball ranch. (Tr. 
255,256). 
(4) The Kimball Ranch, which is a 985 acre ranch 
contiguous to the aforesaid 480 acres is not involved in 
this suit. 
2. T H E O P T I O N (Exhibit P-4). 
On or about July 20, 1970 Milton A. Christensen, 
the agent, confidant and fiduciary of Walter Kershaw, 
obtained from Kershaw a signature on an option, said 
option at said time being in blank and said option having 
been given for the sole purpose of attempting to assist 
Milton A. Christensen in making an application for a 
loan to the Farmer's Home Administration; its purpose 
being to buy out Kershaw's interest in all his Millard 
County properties including the property involved and 
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described herein. (Tr. 152, 531). Christensen was hope-
lessly in debt to Kershaw and others, he having filed 
bankruptcy and having listed debts in the approximate 
amount of One Million Dollars and he having further 
owed Walter Kershaw at said time debts in the sum of 
approximately $150,000.00 (Tr. 196). 
Kershaw testified that the option sued upon herein 
was first presented to him on or about July 20, 1970, 
and that at the time the option was presented to him the 
option was blank (Tr. 511). He testified that there was 
no consideration for the option; that there was no name 
or address placed thereon nor was there any county 
designated; that the property was not described; that his 
name, residence and the period for which the option 
was to remain irrevocable was totally blank; that at the 
date the option bears, August 8, 1970, he was absent 
from the State of Utah. The purchase price for the land 
involved 480 acres in the option) was purported $7,-
200.00. Kershaw testified that this also was placed in 
the option without his consent and knowledge and with-
out his authorization (Tr. 511, 514). 
Kershaw further testified (and Christensen agrees) 
that the only purpose of the option to Christensen was 
so that Christensen could make application for a loan 
with the United States Department of Agriculture 
Farmer's Home Administration in order that he might 
bring his debt arrearage current to Kershaw and pur-
chase from Kershaw, Kershaw's interest in all of his 
property in Millard County and assume all indebted-
ness thereon (Tr. 152, 531). 
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3. T H E A G E N C Y 
Christensen commenced to act as agent for Walter 
W. Kershaw in 1968 and this relationship continued 
through August of 1970 (Tr. 149, 151). In this regard 
in 1968 Christensen purchased the Kimball Ranch for 
and on behalf of Kershaw and said sale was consum-
mated by the Kimball people to Kershaw in the Spring 
of 1969 for a price of $130,000.00 and in connection 
therewith, Christensen negotiated a loan with Pruden-
tial Life Insurance Company in excess of $100,000.00 
(Tr. 142). This ranch was subsequently sold to Christ-
ensen for $150,000.00 and repossessed by Kershaw fin-
ally (Tr. 198). Christensen negotiated for and on be-
half of Kershaw an interest in the Staples escrow (Tr. 
144). This interest was conveyed to Kershaw in July, 
1969, by bill of sale and assignment and a quiet claim 
deed which were admitted as evidence and identified 
herein as Exhibit P-3. On this date Kesler owned the 
entire escrow. I t is uncontradicted that Kershaw ac-
quired all of Kesler's interest in the 480 acres. 
With regard to the eighty (80) acres, Christensen 
testified he negotiated the acquisition of this land for 
Kershaw from Grant and Grace Staples for the sum 
of $3,000.00. This title was involved in a probate pro-
ceedings in that Grant Staples was incompetant. Clear 
title was not available (Tr. 152, 298). Christensen 
subsequently as agent and confidant of Walter W. 
Kershaw negotiated and acquired for him a well permit 
which was designated in and expended by the drilling 
of a well on the Kimball Ranch (142, 255, 457) and 
the 80 acre tract. 
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At the time the option was signed Christensen was 
operating 560 acres as Kershaw's agent (Tr. 149,151). 
Thereafter Christensen defaulted in his payments on 
the Kimball Ranch to Kershaw and likewise the in-
debtedness of Kershaw to Prudential Insurance Com-
pany fell into arrears (Tr. 198, 523). Thereafter Chris-
tensen filed bankruptcy in May of 1970, and his in-
terest in the Kimball Ranch came under the jurisdic-
tion of the Bankruptcy Court, and defendant Walter 
W. Kershaw was listed as a creditor on his schedules in 
the sum of approximately $150,000.00 (Tr. 196). Ir-
respective of this Christensen continued to operate the 
said 560 acre tract as agent and confidant of Kershaw. 
Such is not disputed. 
4. A C T U A L K N O W L E D G E BY BRAD-
S H A W ON T H E SCOPE, P U R P O S E A N D 
L I M I T A T I O N S OF T H E OPTION. 
Bradshaw knew (a) that the 480 acres was part of 
Staples escrow and as such could not be conveyed, (b) 
that 80 acres was involved in probate proceedings and 
was subject to title limitations, and (c) that well had 
been expended and drilled on Kimball Ranch (Tr. 218, 
387). Bradshaw also knew that on or about December 
1, 1970, Christensen purported to exercise the option, 
but he tendered no money in exercise of the option (Ex. 
P-7). Nor did he have any to tender. (Tr. 234, 274, 
515). Christensen was in any event not "ready, able 
and willing" to perform and even attempted to sell his 
alleged option to Rogers for $2,500 in late December, 
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1970 (Tr. 279). Kershaw then told Christensen (at 
that time) that the option was invalid, was not filled 
in as authorized, was given for the sole purpose of ob-
taining the farm loan and that as the farm loan was 
not obtained he had sold the property to the Rogers 
and the option was revoked (Tr. 516). Bradshaw was 
further informed and was present in the latter part 
of December, 1970 at a meeting held in the office of 
Attorney Weston Bayles where all said parties were 
present along with Rogers who had prior to said meeting 
(December 17, 1970) purchased the property (Tr. ). 
And again Bradshaw was acquainted with the limita-
tions of the option and it was the subject of a heated 
discussion. I t was not until January 8, 1971 that Brad-
shaw, after this full knowledge and after the conveyance 
from Kershaw to Rogers of December 17, 1970, pur-
chased the option and decided to attempt to exercise the 
option rights. ( S e e E x P - 5 ) . 
Kershaw testified that from July 20,1970, the date 
he signed it in blank, until December 2,1970, said option 
was not seen by him. Then on December 2, 1970 it was 
presented to him by Christensen and Attorney Weston 
Bayles with the claim that they were exercising the said 
option. Kershaw testified that he told Christensen and 
Bayles that the option was a nullity, that Christensen 
had violated his trust, that option was spent, that option 
was not filled in as agreed, and that any right claimed 
by virtue of said instrument had been revoked (Tr. 
516). Christensen made no tender of money along with 
his claimed exercise of the option (Ex. P-7), and had 
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no money to tender and in fact tried to peddle the 
so-called option to Rogers later in December for 
$2,500. Ronald Bradshaw testified that at a meeting 
held at the office of Weston Bayles in the latter part 
of December he was advised of the sale by Kershaw to 
Rogers of the properties involved in this action. Also, 
that he purchased by an assignment of said option from 
Christensen on or about January the 8th with full actual 
knowledge of the claims of Rogers (Tr. 340) who had 
purchased the property from Kershaw on December 17, 
1970. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E O P T I O N W A S I N V A L I D B E C A U S E I T 
W A S SOLD BY C H R I S T E N S E N TO BRAD-
S H A W I N V I O L A T I O N OF C H R I S T E N S E N ' S 
A G E N C Y ON U S E OF T H E O P T I O N A N D 
W I T H F U L L K N O W L E D G E BY BRAD-
S H A W OF T H E OPTION'S L I M I T A T I O N S 
A N D T H A T T H E O P T I O N W A S S P E N T A N D 
I N V A L I D . 
Christensen was Kershaw's agent in acquiring 
properties in Millard County (including the 480 acre 
tract and well permit). Kershaw wanted to sell out 
his properties and Christesnen wanted the opportunity 
to acquire them. (Tr. 152). In order for Christensen 
to buy Kershaw out, Christensen would have to bor-
row funds from the United States Department of Ag-
9 
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riculture Farm Home Administration. Therefore, Ker-
shaw on the 21st or 22nd of July gave Christensen the 
option for the sole purpose of obtaining such loan so 
he could buy Kershaw's interests. In September, 1970, 
the loan was turned down. Thereafter, on December 
17, 1970, Kershaw by assignment of the Staples' escrow 
rights and quit claim deeds sold the property involved 
to Rogers. Bradshaw had full knowledge of the agency 
relationship and the limitations on the option and that 
Christensen had tendered no money and that Kershaw 
had repudiated the option. 
An agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters 
within the scope of his agency. 3 Am.Jur. 2d Agency, 
Section 199 citing numerous authorities. And as Brad-
shaw had full knowledge of the agency and its limit-
ation he had a duty to ascertain the extent of the 
agent's authority and was bound by the limitation of 
such authority. 3 Am.Jur. 2d Agency, Section 78 citing 
hosts of authorities. I t is therefore clear that when 
Bradshaw purchased the option from Christensen he 
was bound by the limitations of the option namely an 
option for the sole and only purpose of obtaining a 
loan to finance Christensen's purchase of Kershaw's 
holdings. The loan having been declined, the option 
had no further validity. This was clearly Kershaw's 
interpretation of the option for, as aforementioned, on 
December 17, 1970, he sold the property involved to 
Rogers. Bradshaw, therefore, took the property subject 
to the conveyances of Kershaw to Rogers of December 
17, 1970. 
10 
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The option itself is limited by its own terms to the 
sole purpose of acquiring loans from the Farmers 
Home Administration. In paragraph 2 thereof it states 
as follows: 
"This option is given to enable the Buyer to ob-
tain a loan insured or made by the United States 
of America, acting through the Farmers Home 
Administration, United States Department of 
Agriculture, and its duly authorized representa-
tives, (hereinafter called the "Government"), 
for the purchase of said property." 
The following provision of said option, likewise, indi-
cates that it was for the sole and limited purpose of 
obtaining a government loan and was not a general 
option. In paragraph 6 of said option it states: 
"The seller further agrees to convey said prop-
erty to the Buyer by general warranty deed . . . 
in the form, manner and at the time required by 
the Government, conveying to the Buyer a valid, 
unencumbered, indefeasible fee-simple title to 
said property meeting all requirements of the 
Government. . ." 
Christensen being the agent and confidant of Ker-
shaw, Kershaw had the right to place his trust and con-
fidence in his agent and it was Christensen's duty to 
make a full disclosure to Kershaw of all material facts 
pertaining to the transaction and to keep Kershaw fully 
and completely informed and to make a full and com-
plete disclosure of the entire transaction concerning the 
option. This duty was amplified by reason of the fact 
that he was personally profiting in his own behalf as 
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well as representing the interest of Kershaw. In this 
regard it is settled that one who undertakes to perform 
a fiduciary duty and fails in it is not entitled to com-
pensation. See Holland v. Moreton, 10 Utah 2d 390, 
353 P.2d 989. Christensen by negotiating his loan on 
behalf of himself and Kershaw was legally obligated 
not only to make a full disclosure of all pertinent facts 
to Kershaw, but he was required to represent the con-
tracting parties interest in good faith and to give the 
benefit of the bargain obtained on the sale to his prin-
cipal. There can be no doubt that Christensen violated 
his duty as a confidant with respect to his duties and 
obligations to the principal and that he should not be 
permitted to profit from his gross violation as his fiduc-
iary relationship. At page 398 of the Moreton case it 
states: 
"Moreton was negotiating the sale of the claims 
on behalf of himself and the Hollands. This 
obliged him not only to make a full disclosure of 
all pertinent facts to them, but to represent their 
interests in good faith and to give them the bene-
fit of the bargain obtained on the sale." 
In the present case, Christensen admitted that he 
was acting on behalf of Kershaw and for his benefit 
in obtaining the loan and thus as in the Moreton case, 
Christensen was acting for himself and also for Ker-
shaw, and as his agent he must act in good faith and 
give Kershaw the benefit of the bargain. Rather than 
doing this, Christensen has taken advantage of Ker-
shaw, has taken this property from him without pay-
ing him one cent for his equity and has left him ob-
12 
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ligated to convey by warranty deed the property to 
which he does not even have the legal title and cannot 
get till he pays some $23,000.00 on the Staples escrow. 
I t should further be noted, that Christensen ad-
mitted that he drafted the option to purchase real 
property, Exhibit P-4. (Tr. 226) And although it is 
axiomatic that the intent of the parties to the said 
document is controlling, in the event of any ambiguity, 
it must be construed against him and the lower court 
ignored that rule as it applies to Exhibit P-4. As 
stated above, the purpose of said option was to enable 
the buyer to obtain a loan insured or made by the 
United States of America to buy out all of Kershaw's 
property. If that means what it says, then when the 
loan was denied the purpose of the option was accom-
plished and it terminated. If there is any ambiguity 
as to the intent of the parties, regarding the purpose of 
the option, then that ambiguity must be resolved 
against Christensen who drafted the document, and if 
he had intended this to be a general option available to 
him for any purpose, then as the party drafting the 
document he could have easily so provided but he did 
not do so. 
P O I N T I I 
BRADSHAW PURCHASED THE PROPERTY 
SUBJECT TO KERSHAW'S CONVEYANCES 
TO ROGERS AS SAID CONVEYANCES TO 
ROGERS WERE RECORDED PRIOR TO THE 
RECORDING OF THE OPTION. 
13 
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The assignments of the Staples escrow specifically-
describing the properties and the quit claim deeds from 
Kershaw to Rogers were recorded December 22, 1970. 
The option from Kershaw to Christensen was recorded 
December 23, 1970. Consequently, under Utah Code 
Sec. 57-1-6 Bradshaw was charged with notice that the 
property herein involved had been conveyed by Ker-
shaw to Rogers on December 17, 1970. As noted above, 
Bradshaw did not purchase the option from Christen-
sen until January 8, 1971. Therefore, under said Utah 
Code Sec. 57-1-6 he purchased with full knowledge of 
the conveyances of Kershaws to Rogers of December 
17, 1970, and purchased subject to these conveyances. 
As mentioned in the statement of facts, supra, the 
conveyances from Kershaw consisted of all assignments 
of all rights under the Staples escrow which included 
the 480 acres here involved. Rogers purchased and 
bought these properties involved in this action from 
Kershaw for $5,000.00 subject to the obligations of the 
Staples escrow which was at that time some $26,000.00. 
Therefore, by force of the recording statutes alone, 
any interest Bradshaw obtained from the option was 
subject to Kershaw's conveyances to Rogers of Decem-
ber 17, 1970. I t should further be observed that the 
purported option was never entitled to be recorded in 
any event, never having been acknowledged (See Ex. 
P-4) . 
14 
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P O I N T I I I 
T H E COURT E R R E D IN D I S C H A R G I N G 
T H E J U R Y A F T E R T H R E E A N D ONE-
H A L F D A Y S OF T R I A L . 
For 3 and y% days this action was tried as a jury-
case. Then before these appellants began their case 
in chief, the court dismissed the jury over their ob-
jections. Rogers was entitled to have the issues of fact 
as they affected their claim for quiet title tried by a 
jury, to-wit: 
(1) Whether or not any consideration of $100.00 
was ever paid; 
(2) Whether or not at the time Kershaw signed 
the option it was in blank; 
(3) Was option revoked; possession; and notice. 
(4) The jury should have been given the issue as 
to what, if anything, was said between Kershaw and 
Christensen as to the property to be included in the 
option and what, if anything, was said with regard to 
the purchase price to be paid; also, the proper date, 
time, price, and purpose including whether or not said 
option was a single purpose document fully spent prior 
to so-called acceptance. The issues in this action were 
essentially factual issues to be resolved by a jury. 
I t has long been the rule that quiet title actions 
are legal actions subject to trial by jury. See Holland 
v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 327 Pac 2nd 250 in which 
it was held that parties are entitled as a matter of right 
15 
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to a jury trial. And the Court therein interpreted Sec 
78-21-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as so providing. 
I t says: 
"Right to Jury Trial. — In actions where the 
recovery of specific real or personal property, 
with or without damages . . . an issue of fact 
may be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is 
waived. . ." 
In the Holland case, the Court stated at page 13: 
"This Court has already held that an action to 
quiet title is an action at law and either side upon 
request is entitled to a jury trial." 
And again the Court stated at page 14 as follows: 
"I t is our opinion that the above language, if 
given reasonable and rational construction, must 
be interpreted as declaring that all issues of fact 
relating to possession and rights of possession of 
specific real or personal property may be deter-
mined by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived . . . 
we are of the opinion that where the question is 
presented as to the right to possession, the right 
to a jury trial is guaranteed." 
In the Holland case, the Court likewise relied on Rule 
39, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as supporting the 
right to a jury trial in such cases. Also see Valley 
Mortuary v. Fairbanks, 119 Utah 204, 225 P . 2d 739. 
P O I N T IV 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D I N G R A N T I N G 
S P E C I F I C P E R F O R M A N C E I N T H I S AC-
TION. 
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The trial Court not only violated the cardinal right 
of the defendant Rogers to have his issues tried by 
jury, but granted specific performance in direct viola-
tion of all the established cardinal rules as follows: 
(a) Specific performance cannot be required un-
less all terms of the agreement are clear. 
(b) The court cannot compel the specific perform-
ance of a contract which the parties did not mutually 
agree upon. 
(c) The contract must be free from doubt, fair 
and equitable; free from fraud, surprise, mistake and 
hardship. 
(d) The contract must be free from vagueness 
and ambiguity and leave nothing to conjecture or to be 
supplied by the court. 
(e) I t must be sufficiently certain and definite in 
its terms to leave no reasonable doubt as to what the 
parties intended, and no reasonable doubt of the spec-
ific thing equity is called upon to perform, and it must 
be sufficiently certain as to its terms so that the court 
may enforce it as actually made by the parties. 
(f) A greater degree of certainty is required for 
specific performance in equity than is necessary to 
establish a contract as the basis of the action at law for 
damages. 
See Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 U 2d. 368, 423 P.2d 
491. 
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I t cannot be denied that the option in dispute was 
replete with questions of fact, i.e. (a) the date, (b) 
consideration, (c) property, (d) purchase price, (e) 
date it became revocable, (f) no tender of acceptance. 
All of these items certainly barred specific performance 
under the Pitcher v. Lauritzen, case Supra. 
How the Court could deny Rogers this right to 
trial by jury on the foregoing questions of fact and on 
the expressed warranties and the breach thereof, and 
require forfeiture of his $5,000.00 consideration plus 
$6,600.00 paid on the escrow and $2,850.00 paid on 
the 80 acres, and require him to forfeit these amounts 
without any setoffs or remuneration; and, at the same 
grant Bradshaw specific performance of 480 acres of 
land which was tied up in an escrow and which had an 
indebtedness thereon of $26,000.00; and further to grant 
specific performance of 80 acres of land which is tied 
up in a probate proceeding and further to grant spec-
ific performance of a well which had already been ex-
pended all of which was known to Bradshaw results 
in a very strange conclusion as far as the laws of the 
State of Utah are concerned; it also results in an unjust 
and inequitable judgment as far as Rogers is concerned. 
The Court should further note that Helen G. Ker-
shaw did not sign the option and in spite of this the 
trial Court had ordered and directed specific perform-
ance of the above-described properties, and at the same 
time Helen G. Kershaw did sign all the deeds and war-
rantees which conveyed all of her right, title, and in-
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terest to the Rogers and these express warranties and 
conveyances to the Rogers were ignored by the Court. 
The judgment of the lower court purports to quiet 
the title to the property involved in this action as to 
the interest held by Walter W. Kershaw and also as 
to the interest held by Helen G. Kershaw, and the 
court cannot decree specific performance against Ker-
shaw for the reasons hereinabove stated and cannot 
decree specific performance against Helen G. Kershaw 
either as she never signed the said option. 
As hereinabove stated, under the evidence in this 
action the court must be able to find that there is no 
reasonable doubt as to what the parties intended, and 
under the evidence it could not and did not. The court 
could not even find such by clear and convincing evid-
ence, and did not purport to do so. The court only 
purported to make its findings based upon a prepond-
erance of the evidence (See paragraph 6 of the lower 
court's memorandum decision.) The court cannot de-
cree specific performance based only upon a prepond-
erance of the evidence. 
P O I N T V 
S H O U L D T H E COURT NOT Q U I E T T I T L E 
I N R O C K E R F E L L E R L A N D A N D L I V E -
STOCK COMPANY, T H E N T H E COURT 
S H O U L D A W A R D D A M A G E S TO ROCKER-
F E L L E R A G A I N S T K E R S H A W ON T H E 
W A R R A N T I E S . 
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The Court erred in dismissing said appellant's 
Cross Claim against Kershaw. In this regard, the ap-
pellant's Cross Claim against Kershaw for Breach of 
Contract is based upon the warranties which he had 
extended in his conveyances to appellants. Defendants' 
Exhibit #D-7-D-9 were signed by Walter W. Kershaw 
and Helen G. Kershaw, and contain this language 
(page 1 of E x . D - 7 ) : 
"The assignor warrants that he has succeeded to 
all of the rights, claims and interests of the other 
buyers named in said escrow agreement and now 
stands in the position of being the sole buyer 
therein and in and to the properties covered 
thereby, and that he is sole and only owner of 
said escrow agreement insofar as the rights of the 
buyers therein are concerned and has full power, 
right and authority to make, execute, and deliver 
the instant assignment." 
If the option was valid, then Kershaw has breached 
his warranty agreement to convey good title to said 
properties to the Rogers. The damages sustained by 
the Rogers, in that event was $42,500.00. The trial 
Court completely disregarded the expressed warranties 
set forth above, which were solomnly agreed to by Ker-
shaws and Rogers and K N O W I N G L Y executed and 
granted by Kershaws some 17 days after the confront-
ation with Christensen concerning the alleged option. 
In the light of the undisputed testimony of Maurice 
Harding as to the value of the land ($65.00 per acre 
for the 560 acres) and of Bradshaw as to the value of 
the well permit ($6000) the trial court clearly erred 
in holding that there was no proof of damages to Rock-
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erfeller Land & Livestock Co., when it failed to get its 
bargain under said conveyances. (Tr. 486, 451). 
CONCLUSION 
I t is respectfully urged that this Court hold that 
the option sued upon herein was a void, spent, and re-
voked option, that Rogers (Rockerfeller) is entitled to 
recover on its deeds and warranties, that the Court 
erred in depriving Rogers of his right to have the jury 
render a verdict after it had sat on the case for nearly 
four days. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R O B E R T C. CUMMINGS 
W I L L I A M H . H E N D E R S O N 
MARK S. M I N E R 
Attorneys for Appellants, 
Rockerfeller Land & Livestock Co., 
Edward B. Rogers 
Willard B. Rogers 
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